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This project is an empirical analysis of trademarks that have 
received rejections based on their “scandalous” nature.  It is the first of 
its kind. 
The Lanham Act bars registration for trademarks that are 
“scandalous” and “immoral.”  While much has been written on the 
morality provisions in the Lanham Act, this piece is the first scholarly 
project that engages an empirical analysis of the Section 2(a) rejections 
based on scandalousness; it contains a look behind the scenes at how 
the morality provisions are applied throughout the trademark 
registration process.  This study analyzes which marks are being 
rejected, what evidence is being used to reject them, and who the 
applicants are.  Our data pays particularly close attention to the 
evidence used to determine whether a mark is scandalous.  We also 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks serve primarily to identify a source of goods and 
services.1  This function enables trademarks to both reduce consumer 
search costs and incentivize producers to develop goodwill in their 
products and services.2  Trademark rights are determined by priority of 
 
1 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even 
if that source is unknown.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367, 
417 (1999) (claiming that historically trademark ownership was attributed to the individual who 
“was conveniently placed and strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public interest in a 
mark’s ability to identify accurately the source of the goods to which it was attached.”). 
2 Scholars have long debated the proper balance and scope of these normative goals of trademark 
law.  The view that a core value of trademark law is to reduce consumer search costs is associated 
with the Chicago School of law and economics.  William N. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (arguing that trademark law 
seeks to “promote economic efficiency”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (commenting that the 
goal of trademark law has been to support information flow and reduce consumer search costs); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 
1687, 1695–96 (1999) (stating that the goal of trademark law is “to enable the public to identify 
easily a particular product from a particular source”); Lunney, supra note 1, at 432 (stating that 
“by enabling consumers to connect information to precise product[s] more accurately, trademarks 
help consumers express more accurately their preferences and tastes.”).  Other scholars have 
criticized this approach and argued that trademark law has historically been designed as a 
mechanism to protect producer interests.  See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1848 (arguing that “‘traditional’ American 
trademark law was unapologetically producer-oriented. Trademark law, indeed all of unfair 
competition law, was designed to promote commercial morality and protect producers from 
illegitimate attempts to divert their trade.”).  See also Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of 
Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (positing that trademark law may instead be 
Carpenter & Garner – NSFW: Scandalous Trademarks  
324 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 33:321 
use in commerce, and trademark registration confers significant benefits 
to a mark owner.3  Trademark registration is a powerful tool for an 
entity interested in building a strong brand.  Among other benefits, 
registration confers nationwide rights,4 serves as prima facie evidence of 
ownership of a particular mark,5 and enables enhanced protections 
against counterfeiting.6  Under the Lanham Act, certain types of 
trademarks cannot be registered; for the most part, these provisions 
correspond with the core function and purpose of trademark law.  For 
example, trademarks that increase consumer search costs and create 
inefficiencies in the marketplace cannot be registered.  These may 
include marks that are merely descriptive, as well as marks likely to 
cause consumer confusion or mislead consumers in some way.7 
The Lanham Act also bars registration of marks that are 
scandalous or immoral.8  Under Section 2(a), marks cannot be registered 
 
viewed as a system of rules designed to protect the integrity of a sign’s meaning).   
3 15 U.S.C. §1127 defines use in commerce.  For goods, the mark must be placed on the goods, 
or their containers, tags or labels, and must be sold or transported in commerce. For services, the 
mark must be displayed in the sale or advertising, and services must be rendered in commerce.  
Use requirements support the policies behind trademark law by enabling consumers to identify 
the source of goods and services, preventing reservation of rights in marks that are not being used 
in the marketplace, and putting others on notice of trademark rights.     
4 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012) (“Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register 
provided by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute 
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in 
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”).  See discussion infra 
Part I. 
5 Id. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by 
this Act shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration 
of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to 
use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in 
the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.”).  See discussion 
infra Part I. 
6 Id. § 1124 (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of any 
domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in any 
foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the 
United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that 
the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any foreign country 
or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted 
to entry at any custom house of the United States.”).  See discussion infra Part I. 
7 Id. § 1052. For example, Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act bars registration for marks that:  
Consist[] of or comprise[] a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent 
and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by 
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
Id. § 1052(d).  Section 2(e) bars registration for marks that, “when used on or in connection with 
the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.”  Id. § 
1052(e). 
8 Id. § 1052(a).  The full text of Section 2(a) bars registration of marks that: 
Consist[] of or comprise[] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which 
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, 
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a 
geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, 
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if they “comprise[] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”9  This 
prohibition raises many questions.  How is this provision of the Lanham 
Act being applied in practice?  Under what circumstances do examiners 
decide that a mark is scandalous or immoral?  What is the impact of 
this provision on trademark owners?  And what are the implications for 
trademark law as a whole? 
This project is the first of its kind.  While much has been written 
on the morality provisions in the Lanham Act, this piece is the first to 
look behind the scenes and engage an empirical analysis of Section 2(a) 
rejections based on scandalousness.  This project looks in-depth at 
trademarks that have received rejections based on their “scandalous” 
nature.  We look at which marks are being rejected, what evidence is 
being used to reject them, and who the applicants are.  We consider 
whether this bar is effective at removing these “scandalous” marks from 
the consumer marketplace.  Our data pays particularly close attention to 
the evidence used to support a refusal based on scandalousness. 
Our analysis proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses trademark 
registration and the morality provisions generally.  We discuss the 
benefits of federal trademark registration, including the value of 
registration to both trademark owners and the system itself.  We also 
discuss the development of the morality bars and their treatment in 
scholarly literature.  Many scholars have been critical of the morality 
provisions both de jure and de facto, and solutions proposed in the 
literature vary.10  In Part II, we explain our methodology and the process 
by which we arrived at the data we present.  Throughout the course of 
our research, we analyzed 232 trademark records containing 
applications that received a scandalousness refusal in either the first or 
 
identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection 
with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the 
WTO Agreement (as defined in section 2(9) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
[19 U.S.C. §3501(9)]) enters into force with respect to the United States. 
9 Id. 
10 Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as 
Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 214 (2007); Stephen R. Baird, 
Moral Intervention in The Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and 
Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 798 (1993); Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. 
Murphy, Calling Bulls**t on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and 
Disparaging Marks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 468–82 (2011); Christine Haight Farley, 
Stabilizing Morality in Trademark Law, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1019 (2014); Anne Gilson LaLonde 
& Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 
TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1533–1534 (2011); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: 
Proposing Thin Protection of Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 71–
72, 74, 76 (2008); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and 
“Scandalous” Trademarks Should be Federally Registrable, 6 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 191, 209 
(1996); Danwill Schwender, Congressional Trademark Delusion: Section 2(a) Expands The 
Unclean Hands Doctrine Too Far, 48 IDEA 225, 245 (2008); Regan Smith, Trademark Law and 
Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
451, 453 (2007).  
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second Office Action, and gathered information about the applicants, 
the marks, and the prosecution record.  In Part III, we present our 
findings.  While scandalousness is given its meaning from the 
perspective of a substantial composite of the general public in context of 
the relevant marketplace for the applicant’s goods or services identified 
in the application, trademark examiners often refuse applications by 
reference to dictionary definitions alone.11  Our findings indicate that 
the vast majority of Office Actions for refusals based on scandalousness 
do not consider the context of the marketplace at all; our data also 
indicate that context is the most common argument made by applicants 
to refute a rejection.  The absence of consideration of context is true 
even for “niche” markets, such as adult entertainment.  To the extent 
that examiners address context, they generally use it only to support the 
scandalous nature of the mark, rather than consider how context may 
make a mark less scandalous: If a mark is used on “scandalous” goods 
or services, that use reinforces the scandalous nature of the mark; if a 
mark of questionable taste is used on general goods, it becomes more 
scandalous in context.  Furthermore, our data indicate that refusals and 
approvals are highly inconsistent and unpredictable.  We find that the 
morality bars found in Section 2(a) have a disproportionate impact on 
individuals and small businesses, which are the primary applicants for 
such marks.  These applicants are more likely to file applications pro se 
and are less likely to file responses to Office Actions, choosing instead 
(or by default) to simply abandon the application.  Finally, most of these 
marks are still in use, either by the applicant or by third parties, even 
after refusal of registration, something that frustrates one of the key 
purposes of the morality bar. 
I.   THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM AND MORALITY 
Trademark law seeks to foster fair competition.  As the federal 
instrument of trademark law, the purpose of the Lanham Act is two-
fold; at its base, it is both a consumer protection mechanism and a 
producer protection mechanism.12  It seeks to reduce consumer search 
costs by assuring consumers that they are buying the goods they believe 
 
11 See In re Blvd Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]n a case in which the 
evidence shows that the mark has only one pertinent meaning, dictionary evidence alone can be 
sufficient to satisfy the PTO’s burden.”). 
12 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,1274 (“The 
purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may be 
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, 
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-
mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in 
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established rule of 
law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.”). 
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they are buying with the qualities they expect from a particular brand.13  
Thus, it also incentivizes producers to invest time, money, and energy 
into the quality of goods and services presented to the public under a 
particular mark.14 
A. Trademark Registration is Valuable Both to Trademark Owners and 
to the Trademark System as a Whole 
The federal registration system is a key element of brand strategy 
for trademark owners.  While common law trademark rights accrue 
through use of the mark in commerce, federal registration of a 
trademark provides additional substantive and procedural rights that are 
unavailable to common law marks.15  Marks may be registered on either 
the Principal or Supplemental Register.16  Federal registration on the 
Principal Register confers the greatest benefit to a trademark owner.  It 
creates a statutory presumption that the trademark is valid, the registrant 
is the owner of that mark, and that the registrant has the exclusive right 
to use it on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the 
registration.17  Registration on the Principal Register also serves as 
constructive notice of a claim of ownership, eliminating third-party 
defenses based on good faith adoption and use after the registration 
date.18  Marks on the Principal Register also enjoy nationwide priority 
 
13 Id. at 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275 (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of 
competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the 
buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trademarks encourage the maintenance of quality by 
securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect 
trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to 
secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their 
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). But see McKenna, supra 
note 2, at 1840–41 (arguing that trademark law was not traditionally intended to protect 
consumers, and instead, “like all unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from 
illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.”). 
14 S. REP. NO. 79-1333. See McKenna, supra note 2, at 1840–41. 
15 Common law rights arise from use of a mark in commerce.  Unregistered marks have limited 
rights at common law and under the Lanham Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (establishing a 
cause of action in Section 43(a) for infringement of unregistered marks).  Additional rights 
available to registered marks can be found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072.   
16 Applicants must specify whether they are applying to register a mark on the Principal or 
Supplemental Register  If an applicant does not specify, the examining attorney will require the 
applicant to amend the application to specify only one, or to file a request to divide the 
application under 27 C.F.R. § 2.87.  USPTO, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 
(TMEP) § 801.02(b) (2015).  If an applicant does not specify a particular register in an 
application, the examiner will presume the applicant intends to apply for the Principal Register.  
TMEP § 801.02(a); TMEP § 801.02(b); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091–1096. 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register 
provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of 
the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive 
right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services 
specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated in the certificate.”). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (“Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this chapter or 
under the Act of March 3, 1981, or the Act of February 20, 1905, shall be constructive notice of 
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in direct contrast to common law rights, which only extend to the 
geographical reach of the market.19  They can become “incontestable” 
after five years of continuous use, after which time they can only be 
challenged on limited statutory grounds.20  And owners of marks on the 
Principal Register can file the certificate of registration with the U.S. 
Customs Service to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods.21 
The Supplemental Register, on the other hand, is for registration of 
marks that are not inherently distinctive and have not yet acquired 
secondary meaning.  While these marks are capable of distinguishing 
the applicant’s goods or services, they do not yet signify in the minds of 
the public a particular source of goods or services.  While marks on the 
Supplemental Register do not enjoy the full extent of benefits of those 
registered on the Primary Register, it does enable use of the registered 
trademark symbol, acts as a bar to registration of confusingly similar 
marks, and may serve as the basis for an international trademark 
application.22 
B. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Bars Registration of Marks that are 
Scandalous or Immoral 
Section 2(a) bars registration of marks that are “scandalous” or 
“immoral.”23  While scandalousness and immorality are not precisely 
 
the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof.”). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register 
provided by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute 
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in 
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (“Except on a ground for which application to cancel may be filed at any 
time under paragraphs (3) and (5) of section 1064 of this title, and except to the extent, if any, to 
which the use of a mark registered on the principal register infringes a valid right acquired under 
the law of any State or Territory . . . the right of the owner to use such registered mark in 
commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been 
in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still 
in use in commerce, shall be incontestable.”). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the 
name of any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader 
located in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to 
citizens of the United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to 
believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any 
foreign country or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in fact manufactured, 
shall be admitted to entry at any custom house of the United States . . . .”). 
22 See TMEP §§ 815, 816 for procedures related to registration of marks on the Supplemental 
Register.  15 U.S.C. §1094 (“The provisions of this chapter shall govern so far as applicable 
applications for registration and registrations on the supplemental register as well as those on the 
principal register, but applications for and registrations on the supplemental register shall not be 
subject to or receive the advantages of sections 1051(b), 1052(e), 1052(f), 1057(b), 1057(c), 
1062(a), 1063 to 1068, inclusive, 1072, 1115, and 1124 of this title.”). 
23 The 1905 Trade-Mark Act was the first to ban trademarks of ill-repute.  Trade-Mark Act of 
1905 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 85(a) (1946) (repealed 1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1052 
(2012)) (“That no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be distinguished from 
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synonymous, courts include immoral matter within the parameters of 
scandalousness; there are no cases that directly and independently 
consider immorality.24  Whether a mark is barred for moral reasons, 
thus, is evaluated according to the ordinary and common meaning of the 
word “scandalous” in 1938, when the provision was introduced.25  
According to the 1938 dictionary, scandalous matter is “shocking to the 
sense of propriety, offensive to the conscience or moral feelings or 
calling out for condemnation.”26  During that period of time, it was 
common to regulate content based on its scandalous nature.  The 
Motion Picture Production Code,27 also called the Hays Code, 
prohibited a variety of content based on moral judgment, including 
pointed profanity,28 miscegenation,29 revenge in modern times,30 and 
dances that emphasize indecent movements.31  It further restricted 
content by requiring particular care for subjects like methods of crime,32 
sympathy for criminals,33 childbirth,34 and suggestive postures and 
 
other goods of the same class shall be refused registration as a trade-mark on account of the 
nature of such mark unless such mark [c]onsists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter.”). 
This prohibition was imported into the Lanham Act by Fritz Lanham, a Texas Congressman who 
introduced the Act in 1938.  In section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress has explicitly forbidden 
registration for certain categories of marks including those that “[c]onsist[] of or comprise[] 
immoral . . . or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute . . . .”  15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
24 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981), aff’g 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 753 
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (“Because of our holding, infra, that appellant’s mark is ‘scandalous,’ it is 
unnecessary to consider whether appellant’s mark is ‘immoral.’ We note the dearth of reported 
trademark decisions in which the term ‘immoral’ has been directly applied.”). 
25 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
26 Id. at 328 (defining scandalous according to the Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary as 
“1. Causing or tending to cause scandal; * * * shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or 
propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable. * * *” and the 1932 Webster’s New International 
Dictionary as “2. Giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; exciting reprobation; calling 
out for condemnation. * * *”   Most modern Office Action rejections based on scandalousness 
repeat this language verbatim).  See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486. 
27 A CODE TO GOVERN THE MAKING OF TALKING AND MOTION PICTURES (Motion Pictures 
Producers and Distributors of America, Inc. 1930) (“Motion picture producers . . . know that the 
motion picture within its own field of entertainment may be directly responsible for spiritual or 
moral progress, for higher types of social life, and for much correct thinking.  During the rapid 
transition from silent to talking pictures they have realized the necessity and the opportunity of 
subscribing to a Code to govern the production of talking pictures and of re-acknowledging this 
responsibility.”). 
28 Id. ¶ V., (“Pointed profanity (this includes the words, God, Lord, Jesus, Christ - unless used 
reverently - Hell, S.O.B., damn, Gawd), or every other profane or vulgar expression however 
used, is forbidden.”). 
29 Id. ¶ II(6).  Incidentally, “white slavery” was also forbidden, but, notably, not black slavery.  
Id. ¶ II(5).   
30 Id. ¶ I(1)(c) (“Revenge in modern times shall not be justified.”). 
31  Id. ¶ VII(2) (“Dances which emphasize indecent movements are to be regarded as obscene.”). 
32 Id. ¶ I(2) (“Methods of crime should not be explicitly presented.”).   
33 Id. ¶ I (Crimes against the law “shall never be presented in such a way as to throw sympathy 
with the crime as against law and justice or to inspire others with a desire for imitation.”). 
34 Id. ¶ II(8) (“Scenes of actual child birth, in fact or in silhouette, are never to be presented.”). 
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gestures.35 
While the Hays Code claimed a moral responsibility to bring 
entertainment to a “higher level of wholesome[ness] . . . for all the 
people,”36 the legislative history of the Lanham Act does not provide 
insight into the purpose of the prohibition on scandalous trademarks.  
Scholars generally speculate that reasons for the ban on registration of 
these marks may include a desire to protect the public welfare and 
morals, a government refusal to put an official imprimatur on marks that 
are scandalous and immoral, and a position that the government should 
not put resources into protecting marks of questionable taste.37 
C. Morality Bars Have Been Criticized Across the Spectrum of 
Intellectual Property 
Although other forms of intellectual property, including copyright 
and patent, have discriminated against works based on morality in the 
past, there has been a trend towards eliminating restrictions based on 
morality.  In the past, copyright law contained bars to protection based 
on morality, a restriction that has since been removed.  While Congress 
has generally construed the term “writings” in the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution broadly to cover almost every type of literary 
property, “obscene” works were denied copyright protection until fairly 
recently.38  The modern view is to afford copyright protection to all 
eligible works, regardless if a community regards a work as immoral or 
obscene.39  The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have expressly held that 
obscene works are copyrightable, reasoning that the need for national 
copyright protection outweighs the state and federal public policies 
against obscenity.40  This is the approach taken by the Copyright Office 
 
35 Id. ¶ II(2)(b) (“Excessive and lustful kissing, lustful embraces, suggestive postures and 
gestures, are not to be shown.”) 
36 Id. Preamble. 
37 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468 (citing Baird, supra note 10, at 788). 
38 See, Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (holding that works must be 
“free from illegality or immorality” to obtain copyright protection); contra Mitchell Bros. Film 
Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) 
(removing immoral standard).  
39 See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.17 
(“Mitchell expressly held that a work is not excluded from copyright protection by reasons of its 
obscene content.  This may be taken as the currently prevailing view, although in the past, a 
number of courts took the view that obscene works are not eligible for copyright.”) 
40 Jartech, Inc., v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982); Mitchell Bros. Film Group, 604 F.2d at 
862.  In 1979, the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers that works could not be excluded from 
copyright because of obscene content. In Mitchell Brothers, copyright owners of the adult film 
Behind the Green Door brought an infringement suit against a group of theater owners showing 
the film without permission. Defendants argued that the copyright holders brought suit with 
“unclean hands,” and that equity should uphold obscenity as an affirmative defense to 
infringement. The Fifth Circuit did not agree, rejecting the “moral conservator theory of copyright 
invalidation,” the “property interest theory,” and the unclean hands equitable doctrine. The court 
reasoned that Congress had intentionally omitted, and therefore did not intend, a bar for immoral 
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today. 
Patents were once invalidated based on a theory of moral utility, 
requiring “ . . . the invention [to] not be frivolous or injurious to the well 
being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”41  Under this definition, 
“immoral” or “mischievous” inventions were not patentable because 
those uses were not beneficial to society.  The evolution to disregard 
morality as a basis for patentability is well illustrated in the context of 
gambling.  In 1889, devices related to gambling were found to lack 
utility, and thus were not patentable.42  However, an invention that was 
solely used for gambling was granted a patent in 1977.43  In Ex parte 
Murphy, the Board stated that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) “should not be the agency which seeks to enforce a 
standard of morality with respect to gambling, by refusing, on the 
ground of lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent.”44  The moral 
utility theory has not been used since that time, a fact that has led 
scholars to characterize it as a relic of the past.45 
Many scholars have been critical of the morality provisions both 
de jure and de facto, and proposed solutions vary.46  Critics of the bar 
 
or obscene works. The court further argued that denying copyright to obscene works was contrary 
to the Intellectual Property Clause’s purpose of promoting creativity, and reasoned that the 
market was the appropriate arbitrator in determining if a work is fit for public consumption. The 
Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Jartech, a case decided three years 
after the Mitchell Brothers decision and the first major copyright-morality case under the 
Copyright Act of 1976. The issue of copyrightability of obscene material has remained untouched 
at the appellate level since Jartech. 
41 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); Llewellyn Joseph 
Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) 
Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 205 n.88 (2005). 
42 Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90 (N.D. Ill. 1889). 
43 Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802–803 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 29, 1977). 
44 Id.  “While some may consider gambling to be injurious to the public morals and the good 
order of society, we cannot find any basis in [35 U.S.C. 101] or related sections which justify a 
conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable 
utility.”  Id. 
45 Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 
2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 248 (2000).  In the landmark case Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange 
Bang, Inc., the patent in question created the illusion that liquid was being dispensed from a 
container above a spout when it was really pumped from a container hidden below the counter.  
When Juicy Whip sued a competitor for infringement, the competitor claimed that the patent was 
invalid because it lacked utility due to its deceptiveness. The district court found the patent 
invalid because its purpose was to increase sales by deception, but the 2
nd
 Circuit reversed. The 
court reasoned “the fact that one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a 
specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.” The court subsequently 
described several issued patents that had utility because they were designed to represent 
something that they were not.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Band, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“ . . . but the principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed 
to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in recent years.”). 
46 Abdel-Khalik, supra note 10, at 214; Baird, supra note 10, at 798; Farley, supra note 10; 
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1533-34; Phillips, supra note 10, at 71–72, 74, 76; Reiter, 
supra note 10, at 209; Schwender, supra note 10, at 245; Smith, supra note 10, at 453. .  
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have accused it of being ineffective, inconsistent, and possibly illegal.47  
Several scholars have questioned whether the bar has been at all 
effective in removing offensive trademarks from the marketplace, or 
whether it has merely removed them from the screen of the federal 
register.48  Furthermore, inconsistencies exist in the application of the 
bar, both internally and with regard to the basic purpose and function of 
trademark law.49  Scholars have also considered whether the provision 
violates the First Amendment protections of the U.S. Constitution.50  
Even defenders of the provision have suggested solutions to “fix” the 
problems presented by the bar.51  Proposed solutions include eliminating 
the terms “scandalous” and “immoral” from the statute altogether, 
amending the statute to provide more specificity, and devising new 
procedures to better effectuate the object and purpose of the bars.52 
In this paper, we do not seek to solve the problems presented by 
the morality bars found in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.  Rather, we 
recognize that in order to be effective, the first step to any solution is to 
seek a thorough understanding of the depth and breadth of the problem 
itself.  Accordingly, this paper presents an empirical analysis of the 
application of the scandalousness bar. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
We examined an original dataset of 232 trademark records 
containing a Section 2(a) refusal based on scandalousness and 
immorality for applications filed between 2001 and 2011.  Because the 
USPTO’s database does not enable searches by grounds for refusal of a 
particular mark, based on previous research and study we used the 
USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System (“TESS”) to search for 
marks containing terms that would likely meet trademark examiners’ 
criteria for a Section 2(a) refusal on these grounds.  Once we identified 
salient terms for particular refusals, we searched for a sample of 
additional marks containing those terms, and extrapolated to additional 
related marks across the broad spectrum of categories for refusal 
outlined by Gilson and LaLonde: profanity; sex; violence; disability; 
ethnicity; religion; politics; and scatology.53 
We reviewed the life cycle of the trademark application in its 
entirety for each mark, from application through either final refusal or 
 
47 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10. 
48 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468–73; LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1534. 
49 Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 10, at 468–73; LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1534. 
50 See Baird, supra note 10, at 661; Smith, supra note 10, at 451. 
51 See, e.g., Farley, supra 10, at 101.   
52 See Abdel-Khalik supra note 10 (arguing for a two-tiered approach to determine whether a 
mark is scandalous); Reiter, supra note 10; Schwender, supra note 10 (arguing that the market 
should be sufficient to weed out objectionable marks).  
53 LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 10, at 1510–30. 
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registration, in an effort to examine how trademark applications are 
being analyzed based on this particular provision of Section 2(a).  Our 
dataset includes a variety of information about the applicants, the marks 
themselves, and the goods/services identified in the application.  It also 
includes an analysis of any Office Actions issued by the USPTO, 
including grounds for refusal, evidence presented, and explicit 
reasoning of the examining attorney.  It includes information about any 
Office Action responses filed on behalf of the applicant, including rate 
of response and arguments submitted, as well as the final dispensation 
of the application. 
When analyzing the USPTO record for each mark, we looked at 
each Office Action issued and the applicant’s responses, where 
applicable.54  In order to determine whether context was used in an 
examiner’s evaluation of a particular application, we considered 
whether the examiner or applicant referred specifically to the goods, the 
marketplace those goods are or would be sold in, internet evidence such 
as computer filters or search results, the visual context of the mark 
itself, alternate meanings of the word(s), and any evidence the word is 
or is not scandalous in society, as well as other individual arguments as 
raised by the applicants or examiner.55  We did not count third-party 
registrations and refusals as a contextual factor, although applicants 
frequently used this information as an argument in support of 
registration.56 
In order to assess inconsistencies between or within the disposition 
of applications by the USPTO, we also did a “deep-dive” into a few 
specific terms for which marks were rejected by examiners.  These 
terms include: BITCH, POTHEAD, SHIT, SLUT, and WHORE.  We 
selected these marks based on identified inconsistencies in the dataset.  
For these terms, to provide a representative sample we searched all 
marks containing those terms, and selected marks identified by the 
Basic Index field of the Structured Search engine of the TESS of the 
USPTO with an application date of even years during the selected 
research period.57  Where there were more than thirty-five such marks 
for each year, we only reviewed the first thirty-five listed.  For these 
marks, we reviewed all trademark proceedings from application through 
to registration or final refusal. 
 
54 There are a few marks where the USPTO record is incomplete, consisting solely of a 
registration certificate.  See, e.g., KICK ASS LIMITED, Registration No. 2,039,645. 
55 This included evidence such as internet searches, articles, other media using the word, and 
FCC rulings and standards.  For applicants, we also considered arguments such as that the mark 
was self-referential, regulations, and the consumer market.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
56 Though the presence in the marketplace of other marks with similar words would be relevant, 
registration is not required to use a mark and thus not a contextual factor at issue in those 
situations. 
57 The years included 2000; 2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; and 2010.   
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In addition to an examination of the trademark records, we sought 
to obtain additional information about post-registration use of marks 
that received a final refusal.  For each rejected mark, we performed an 
internet search in an effort to determine whether the mark was still in 
use, and, if so, whether the original applicant was the one (or one of the 
ones) using that mark.58 
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A. Scandalousness is to be Determined in the Context of the 
Marketplace, yet Most Refusals Fail to Consider Context of any Kind 
The determination of whether a mark is scandalous must be made 
in the context of current attitudes of the day.59  A trademark is 
scandalous or immoral in context of the relevant marketplace for the 
applicant’s goods or services identified in the application.60 Those 
attitudes must be ascertained from the standpoint of a “substantial 
composite of the general public,” not necessarily a majority.61  Thus, in 
summary, the relevant inquiry is whether a substantial composite of the 
general public would find the mark scandalous in the context of that 
particular marketplace in contemporary society. 
However, over 73% of refusals issued by examiners on the 
grounds of scandalousness failed to discuss context of any kind, 
including the context of the relevant marketplace for the goods and 
services identified in the application.  Though nearly a quarter of the 
applications we reviewed were targeted at niche markets, the fact that a 
particular mark was intended for a niche, rather than a general, market 
did not appear to weigh significantly in the calculation of whether a 
trademark application was rejected or approved for publication.  While 
the marketplace is a key aspect of the legal standard, it did not 
significantly impact the rates of refusal. 
 
58 While we were unable to obtain information about every mark, where we were able to locate 
the mark, the information obtained was notable.  See infra Part III.G. 
59 In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 
485 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d1929 (T.T.A.B. 1996); Greyhound 
Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639 (T.T.A.B. 1988); TMEP § 1203.01. 
60 TMEP § 1203.01; In re Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1371; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485. 
61 In re Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1372–74 (noting the dearth of evidence before the court 
demonstrating which of multiple definitions of “tail” would be best understood by a substantial 
composite of the general public); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485; In re Old Glory Condom 
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (finding that a design mark of a condom decorated 
with stars and stripes in an manner to suggest the American flag was not scandalous where it was 
presented in a patriotic and positive way); In re Thomas Laboratories, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 50, 52 
(T.T.A.B. 1975) (“[I]t is imperative that fullest consideration be given to the moral values and 
conduct which contemporary society has deemed to be appropriate and acceptable.”).  
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The visual context of the mark itself was also often not addressed, 
unless either brought up by the applicant or when it served to reinforce 
the examiner’s viewpoint of the vulgarity of the words in the mark.  
Overall, out of 53 marks with visual context to consider, the examiner 
was the first to reference this context in only 43% of these marks.62  The 
applicant argued visual context for the first time in 13% of these 
marks,63 and in the remaining 43%, visual context was not addressed at 
all by either the applicant or the examiner. 
If the USPTO examining attorneys fail to address context, which is 
a material part of the legal standard, what evidence is being used to 
refuse registrations based on scandalousness/immorality?  The term 
“scandalous” has been held to encompass matter that is merely 
“vulgar.”64  Evidence of the opinions of a substantial composite of the 
general public can include media, including magazine articles, 
newspaper articles, and dictionary definitions.65  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit has held that dictionary definitions alone can be 
sufficient to establish scandalousness where multiple dictionaries 
indicate a word is vulgar and the applicant’s mark indicates the vulgar 
meaning of the word.66 
 
62 The examiner referenced visual context first in 43.4% of the marks.  In 37.74% of marks with 
visual context, the examiner addressed such context in the initial Office Action.  In 5.66%, the 
examiner brought up visual context for the first time in the second Office Action. 
63 13.21% of marks with visual context, constituting seven of the 53 marks which had visual 
context. 
64 Vulgar has been defined as “lacking in taste, indelicate, morally crude.”  In re Runsdorf, 171 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (T.T.A.B. 1971). 
65 TMEP § 1203.01. 
66 The applicant’s use must be limited to the vulgar meaning of the word.  See In re Blvd Entm’t, 
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Trademark examiners are under pressure to meet high quarterly 
quotas of “balanced disposals” of applications.67  Balanced disposals are 
credits that examiners are given as they complete work or take action on 
the total number of classes within a trademark application.68  Quotas are 
based on the attorney’s grade level and quarterly production 
requirements.  An examiner’s performance is evaluated based on 
quantity and quality according to the terms of the USPTO Performance 
Appraisal Plan.69  To be “fully successful,” examining attorneys at a GS 
9/11/2 ranking must have from 425–549 Balanced Disposals per 
quarter.70  To be designated as “outstanding,” the attorney must have 
completed at least 515–75 balanced disposals.71  Aside from the 
quarterly quotas, examiners are under additional time pressures.  For 
example, examiners are asked to complete examination of all new 
applications, including search of the mark and preparing an Office 
Action or a Notice of Allowance, within seven calendar days of 
receipt.72 
1. Dictionary Definitions were the Primary Evidence Used to Support a 
Refusal Based on Scandalousness 
Where a particular mark contains words that are listed as “vulgar” 
in the dictionary, it may be the most expedient—and logical—course of 
action for an examiner to use dictionary definitions to quickly dictate 
acceptance or rejection of a mark.  Examining attorneys under pressure 
to process applications quickly can either ascertain the meaning of a 
mark in the context of current attitudes of the day, which is the legal 
standard, or they can do a quick dictionary search and reject an 
 
334 F.3d 1336, 1340–43 (Fed Cir. 2003) (1-800-JACK-OFF and JACK OFF were scandalous 
where multiple dictionary definitions indicated the term “jack off” was vulgar).   
67 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, available at http://www.nteu245.org/GS-9-11-
12PAP.PDF; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, available at 
http://www.nteu245.org/PAP13-14.pdf.   
68 Examiners take one action for completing an initial examination and making a determination 
regarding the registrability of the mark or “first action” on an application, and one for either 
approving an application for publication or abandonment. 
69 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67.   
70 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67.  See also MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE AND NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES 
UNION, Chapter 245 TM GS-9/11/12 Performance Appraisal Plan, available at 
http://www.nteu245.org/GS-9-11-12PAPMOU.pdf. 
71 GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 67.   
72 For amended applications, the examiner must review the application and take appropriate 
action within 21 calendar days.  For applications returned for correction, the attorney advisor 
takes appropriate action within 7 calendar days.  For applications returned for abandonment, the 
attorney advisor takes appropriate action within 14 calendar days.  GS 9/11/12 PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 69; GS 13/14 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLAN, supra note 69.   
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application if it contains a word that is listed as “vulgar.”  It is no 
wonder that the vast majority of applications that are rejected for 
scandalousness are rejected based on the fact that they contain a word 






Of the records we reviewed, dictionary definitions were used as a 
primary source of support for a rejection based on scandalousness 91% 
of the time.  Examiners used only the dictionary, without any other 
contextual information, as supporting evidence in 70% of Office 
Actions.73  Public or crowd-sourced dictionaries were used in 27% of all 
rejections based on scandalousness.74 
2. The Use of Dictionary Definitions in the Abstract to Support a 
Refusal was Consistent Across Marketplaces, Including Niche Markets 
The tendency of a trademark examiner to rely on dictionary 
definitions as the exclusive or primary evidence for a rejection based on 
scandalousness is consistent across diverse marketplaces.  Though, on 
the face of the applications we reviewed, the bulk of marks are targeted 
for a general market, nearly a quarter (20%) of applications reviewed 
were explicitly targeted for niche markets, such as adult entertainment 
or adult-oriented goods. 
Even within the narrow context of those niche markets, dictionary 
definitions figured as primary evidence in refusals based on 
 
73 162 Office Actions used only the dictionary as evidence for a rejection based on 
scandalousness.  This is over three-quarters (76.78%) of the times that dictionaries are used as 
supporting evidence. 
74 Public or crowd-sourced dictionaries include dictionaries such as Urban Dictionary. 
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scandalousness 91% of the time.  Of those rejections, dictionary 
definitions served as the only evidence used in over half (53%) of the 
refusals.  Evidence regarding the narrowness of the marketplace did not 
appear to be considered, except to reinforce a scandalousness rejection. 
 
 
B. When Examiners do Consider the Context of the Marketplace, They 
Often do so as an Argument Against Registration 
While examiners consider contextual information only 
infrequently, when they do consider context of the marketplace they 
often do so as an argument against registration.75  This is the case 
whether or not the marketplace is a niche or general market.  The 
consideration of context appears to be a Catch-22: If the marketplace is 
of an “adult” nature, that fact is used against the applicant as evidence 
that a scandalous meaning is intended by the mark.  If the marketplace 
is a general consuming market, the examiner often rejects the mark 
because a questionable mark is especially scandalous in a general 
marketplace. 
1. Use of a Mark in an Adult-Oriented Marketplace is Frequently Used 
as Evidence That the Mark Itself is Scandalous or Immoral 
To the extent that examiners consider marketplace context, an 
adult-oriented marketplace may be used as evidence that the mark itself 
is scandalous or immoral.76  Examiners frequently reason that marks 
 
75 Of marks targeted at niche markets, only five Office Actions referenced context of the market 
at all.   
76 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5, 2005) 
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applied to specific adult marketplaces reinforce the assertion that those 
terms are scandalous or vulgar.77  For example, the marks TOKYO 
CREAMPIE and GAYFACIALSXXX were marketed and used in niche 
markets, such as an adult website. However, the very fact that the marks 
were used in those markets was supporting evidence that the general 
public would be scandalized, because usage in that context makes it 
clear that the marks reference sexually explicit material.78  This is the 
case even with regard to marks in narrow and specific markets; while 
the applicant for POST-TITS asserted that the relevant market was 
controlled and narrow, the examiner reasoned that the market was 
irrelevant because the general public would find the mark scandalous.79 
Sometimes, this is the case irrespective of what is contained in the 
application.80  In these situations, context is used only to reinforce the 
vulgar or scandalous meaning.  However, a proper evaluation considers 
whether a substantial composite of the general public would find the 
 
(FUCK.XXX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006) 
(BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug. 
17, 2005) (BIGCOCKSEX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24, 
2005) (COPYCOCK.XXX). 
77 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006) 
(BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 
24, 2005) (COPYCOCK.XXX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,586,759 (filed Mar. 
14, 2005) (YOU COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug. 17, 
2005) (BIGCOCKSEX). 
78 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO 
CREAMPIE) (Third Office Action dated Feb. 2, 2004); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,788,383 (filed Jan. 10, 2006) (GAYFACIALSXXX) (Office Action dated July 15, 2006). 
79 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (Office Action dated 
May 20, 2004). 
80 See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,853,993 (filed Apr. 4, 2006) (TITTY 
CITY) (claiming services in class 41 for “entertainment”); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011) (FAT COCK BEER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) (TOKYO CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
76,490,572 (filed Feb. 19, 2003) (JAPANESE CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 76,639,548 (filed May 25, 2005) (NIGGA); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) (THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007) (TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008) (COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006) (COCAINE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639 
(filed Feb. 28, 2007) (COCAINE CUT THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1, 2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL 
ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) 
(METH); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006) (BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A 
GIRL); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T 
D*N’T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,222 (filed Oct. 24, 2008) 
(SHAKE THOSE TITTIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 
2001) (SHITBEGONE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) 
(“TALKING COCK”). 
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mark scandalous in the context of that particular marketplace.81  It is a 
tautology to reason that a mark is scandalous simply because it is used 
in a specific channel of trade that involves sexually explicit goods or 
services; yet that is a common argument in scandalousness refusals 
when the mark is to be used in an “adult” marketplace.82 
2. Use of a Mark in a General Marketplace is Frequently Used as 
Evidence That the Mark Itself is Scandalous or Immoral 
Most often, the marketplace is abstracted from the analysis 
entirely, and the examiner focuses on whether a substantial composite 
of the general public would find the mark scandalous, with any 
marketplace analysis going to support that argument.  When they do 
consider market context, examining attorneys often consider a more 
general marketplace abstracted from the particular goods or services at 
 
81 See In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660 
F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981); In re Wilcher Corp., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929, 1930-32 
(TTAB 1996); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1639 (TTAB 
1988); TMEP § 1203.01. 
82 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24, 2005) 
(COPYCOCK.XXX) (Third Office Action dated Mar. 12, 2007) (use in connection with the 
goods clearly refers to erotic meanings, reinforcing vulgarity); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,694,903 (filed Aug. 17, 2005) (BIGCOCKSEX) (because the mark is applied in a specific 
marketplace—adult entertainment—it reinforces the vulgarity); U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006) (BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS) (because the mark is 
applied to a specific marketplace—sexually explicit services such as web sites containing adult 
entertainment—and uses that to reinforce assertion that the terms “cock” and “slut” are 
scandalous or vulgar); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,586,759 (filed Mar. 14, 2005) 
(YOU COCK) (use of mark in the field of adult entertainment services reinforces the vulgar 
meaning).  See also U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,484,466 (filed Jan. 22, 2003) 
(TOKYO CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,490,572 (filed Feb. 19, 2003) 
(JAPANESE CREAMPIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,639,548 (filed May 25, 
2005) (NIGGA); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) 
(THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007) 
(TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008) 
(COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) 
(SOCK MY COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006) 
(COCAINE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639 (filed Feb. 28, 2007) 
(COCAINE CUT THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1, 2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (METH); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006) (BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T D*N’T 
STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,600,222 (filed Oct. 24, 2008) (SHAKE 
THOSE TITTIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 2001) 
(SHITBEGONE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) 
(“TALKING COCK”).  One Office Action reasoned precisely to the contrary, claiming that if the 
proposed mark were analyzed in reference to the relevant market base, the mark wouldn’t fail 
because applicants would not tend to adopt marks that would drive away relevant purchasers. 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5, 2005) (FUCK.XXX). 
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issue.  Google searches are a common contextual piece of evidence used 
to demonstrate that a mark is scandalous to the general public.83  For 
instance, in the case of FAT COCK BEER, though the applicant 
submitted a preliminary label to clarify the meaning of the mark, the 
examiner stated that “fat cock” is vulgar slang according to a Google 
search and the mark was therefore scandalous to the general public.84  
Likewise, TITTY PRETTIES was determined to be scandalous based in 
part on a Google search showing that the word “titty” can be used in an 
“offensive and disgraceful manner.”85  Even for marks that are intended 
for a niche market, this sort of abstract marketplace context is applied.86 
Perhaps because of a lack of clarity as to the proper procedure for 
trademark examiners, there are inconsistencies in reasoning across 
refusals.  In at least one instance, the examiner reasoned that a refusal 
was warranted because scandalous information would be found while 
searching for the stated vulgar terms on the internet, rather than the 
reverse, that the mark would be found while searching in general 
commerce.87  The examiner went on to state that the relevant audience 
is irrelevant to an analysis of whether a mark is scandalous or immoral 
because that would help people attempting to register such marks.88  
The examiner reasoned that if the appropriate test were put in context of 
the “relevant population” no mark would ever be refused on Section 
2(a) grounds “since the applicant would not adopt a mark which [sic] 
would drive the relevant purchasers or audience away from using or 
purchasing the applicant’s identified goods or services.”89 
C. When Examiners Consider the Context of Goods and Services, They 
Often do so as an Argument Against Registration 
Our research yielded similar findings with regard to goods and 
services.  Examiners are generally unlikely to consider goods and 
services in Office Actions issued under Section 2(a).  When they do, the 
argument is similarly circular: Goods or services that are adult-oriented 
 
83 22.58% of the time search engine results (Google, Yahoo!, etc.) are used to indicate public 
opinion of the relevant term. 
84 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011). 
85 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,524,781(filed Nov. 30, 2004) (Office Action dated 
July 11, 2005). 
86 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,218,607 (filed Feb. 25, 2003) (CLITS 
AND TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,519,589 (filed Nov. 18, 2004) 
(COOCHIE SMOOCHIE). 
87 The examiner states that websites are ubiquitous and can be accessed by anyone, and notes that 
the attorney found several other scandalous sites while searching for the term “fuckxxx.”  The 
examiner uses this to support the proposition that anyone may come across these goods and 
services, but does not seem to take into consideration that s/he was specifically searching for the 
term “fuckxxx” on the internet.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,643,827 (filed June 5, 
2005) (FUCK.XXX).   
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
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will be used to support a scandalousness refusal on the idea that those 
particular goods and services remove doubt as to the vulgar meaning of 
the mark.  Conversely, where the goods themselves are not scandalous, 
the nature of the goods or services is either ignored or used to support 
the argument that the mark is vulgar; an offensive mark on inoffensive 
goods is especially scandalous. 
1. Use of a Mark on Adult-Oriented Goods is Frequently Used as 
Evidence That the Mark is Scandalous 
As with the marketplace, when the specific goods are referenced 
by the examiner, it is generally used to support an assertion that the 
goods reinforce, or at least do not rebut, the vulgarity.  Specifically, if 
the goods or services are adult-oriented rather than something that 
would be for sale in a more general market, that supports the vulgarity 
aspect because, by removing doubt as to the vulgar meaning, the general 
public will be scandalized.90 
 
90 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,639,658 (filed May 30, 2005) (DO THE 
JEW) (similar goods, not necessarily applicant’s); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
76,415,493 (filed Apr. 29, 2002) (COOCHIECALENDAR); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 77,281,745 (filed Sept. 18, 2007) (THIZZ JUICE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007) (TITTIGYM); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,864,664 (filed Apr. 19, 2006) (MR. HORSE COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,416,780 (filed May 11, 2004) (BLOW JOB BUBBLE GUM); U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 78,416,796 (filed May 11, 2004) (THE ORIGINAL BLOW JOB GUM); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,522,412 (filed July 15, 2008) (HUMP!); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 76,511,051 (filed May 2, 2003) (C P CREAM PIE); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 77,600,723 (filed Oct. 26, 2008) (COCAINE ENERGY); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 77,745,550 (filed May 27, 2009) (RIDE HARD RETARD); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,128,286 (filed Mar. 12, 2007) (TITTY TV); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,788,383 (filed Jan. 10, 2006) (GAYFACIALSXXX); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed July 7, 2005) (SCHLONG WEAR); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,784,737 (filed Jan. 4, 2006) (HISFIRSTHUGECOCK); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,879,965 (filed May 9, 2006) (TIT-MITT); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008) (BEAVERSHAVER); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY COCK); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,866,123 (filed Nov. 5, 2009) (DOUCHEBAG AWARD); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (“TALKING COCK”); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,829,207 (filed Mar. 3, 2006) (COCAINE); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,118,639 (filed Feb. 28, 2007) (COCAINE CUT THE 
LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,119,448 (filed Mar. 1, 
2007) (COCAINE FREE THE LEGAL ALTERNATIVE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,750,399 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (METH); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,038,867 
(filed May 14, 2010) (KO KANE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 
5, 2006) (BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 
(filed July 22, 2003) (POST-TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,558,043 (filed 
Feb. 1, 2005) (HEEB); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,168,702 (filed Nov. 3, 2010) 
(FUCK MEAT); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,643,745 (filed Jan. 6, 2009) (SHIT-
KICKERS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,082,839 (filed July 12, 2010) (BONER 
BIBLE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005) (MY SH!T 
D*N’T STINK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,866,347 (filed Apr. 20, 2006) 
(FUGLY); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH 
YOUR TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,135,356 (filed Jun. 13, 2002) (NICE 
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This is particularly common where the goods in question are adult 
videos.  For the mark MR. HORSE COCK, the examiner noted that the 
wording clearly referred to the subject matter of the movies and was 
“thus . . . shocking to a substantial composite of the general public.”91  
Similarly, the fact that the videotapes intended to be sold under the 
mark JAPANESE CREAMPIE would depict sexual acts meant they 
would be “morally crude” to the general public.92  Non-video goods 
received this treatment as well, such as the product under the mark 
TALKING COCK.  Because the product itself would make what the 
examiner stated were vulgar statements, this reinforced the 
offensiveness of the mark.93 
2. Use of a Mark on Goods Oriented to the General Public is Frequently 
Used as Evidence That the Mark is Scandalous 
Even where the goods themselves are not necessarily scandalous 
alone, they are used to reinforce the vulgarity of the mark.  For 
example, the mark TIT-MITT was rejected in part because the use of 
the word “tit” on bras would ensure people know that the word “tit” was 
used in reference to a woman’s breast.94  In another instance, though 
SCHLONG WEAR95 is for clothing and is a spin-off brand of 
SCHLONGBOARDS,96 the goods were ignored in favor of the slang 
meaning of the word “schlong” and the potentially vulgar nature of the 
mark’s design.97  Similarly, MY SH!T D*N’T STINK is a mark for a 
deodorizer to be used by hikers and other participants in outdoors 
activities. 98  Despite the non-scandalous nature of the goods, the 
examiner reasoned that use of the word “shit” rendered the mark vulgar 
even if the term is relevant and not being used in the vulgar sense.99  
Our research uncovered similar reasoning in refusals for marks TOUCH 
YOUR TITS for shirts100 and TITTIGYM for an adult health and fitness 
 
TITS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,853,993 (filed Apr. 4, 2006) (TITTY CITY); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009) (HAND JOB); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,078,534 (filed Aug. 9, 2001) (SHITBEGONE). 
91 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,864,664 (filed Apr. 19, 2006) (Office Action dated 
Sept. 26, 2006). 
92 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,490,572 (filed Jun. 4, 2003) (Office Action dated 
Aug. 15, 2003). 
93 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78716443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (Office Action 
dated Apr. 3, 2006). 
94 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,879,965 (filed May 9, 2006). 
95 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed July 7, 2005). 
96 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,371,260 (filed Feb. 20, 2004). 
97 Applicant’s additional information regarding what the final mark would look like, particularly 
in the addition of color to emphasize that a monkey in the mark is holding a banana, and a slightly 
edited version of the mark which also served to clarify its non-scandalous nature were rejected by 
the examiner. See id. (Paper Correspondence Incoming dated Apr. 11, 2006). 
98 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,631,791 (filed May 17, 2005). 
99 Id. (Office Action dated Aug. 2, 2006). 
100 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009). 
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club.101  Because TOUCH YOUR TITS was used on shirts, for example, 
the examiner stated that the goods only reinforced the vulgar meaning 
by ensuring consumers realize that breasts are the intended meaning of 
the word.102 
On some occasions, the applicant’s goods were specifically 
mentioned but not elaborated on as to whether or how they support a 
finding of a Section 2(a) refusal.103  There were also a few situations in 
which, although there was nothing that indicated whether the goods 
would be sexual on the face of the application, the examiner inferred 
scandalousness by relating the salient portions of the mark with and 
how it may be applied to the goods in question.  This occurred with both 
TITTIGYM104 for an adult health and fitness club services and TITTY 
TV105 for caps, shirts, shorts, and undergarments. 
D. Examiners Often Acknowledge the Relevance of Context de jure, but 
Disregard it de facto 
Examiners often acknowledge the relevance of context in 
particular Office Actions, but proceed to disregard that context in 
subsequent refusals.  This frequently occurred with regard to profanity.  
In a significant number of rejections, examiners (1) cited the rule that 
trademarks must be evaluated in the context of current attitudes; (2) 
noted that profanity was more common in current society; and then (3) 
concluded that acceptance of profanity makes words no less profane.106  
The examiner then rejected the marks without any additional supporting 
evidence.107  This occurred for marks containing 11 terms out of the 40 
we investigated.  These 11 words account for 125 total records in the 
dataset,108 and this reasoning was present in a majority of all rejections 
 
101 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007).  See also, U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77866123 (filed Nov. 5, 2009) (DOUCHEBAG AWARD) 
(stating that because the mark is clearly not referencing the personal hygiene meaning of the 
word, use of the mark with those goods supports the vulgar meaning). 
102 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH YOUR 
TITS). 
103 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,090,708 (filed Jan. 25, 2007) (STFU); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,519,589 (filed Nov. 18, 2004) (COOCHIE 
SMOOCHIE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,402,917 (filed Feb. 21, 2008) (BAD 
ASS MOTHER FUCKER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,471,577 (filed Aug. 22, 
2004) (I’VE HAD IT UP TO TIKRIT WITH THIS SHIT); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,502,095 (filed Oct. 19, 2004) (IT DON’T MEAN SHIT); U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 76,626,410 (filed Dec. 28, 2004) (FUCK YOU); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 85,268,293 (filed Mar. 16, 2011) (SHITSHOOTER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,735,840 (filed Oct. 18, 2005) (RETARDS GONE WILD); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,750,245 (filed Nov. 9, 2005) (COOCHIE CUSHION). 
104 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,675,279 (filed Apr. 10, 2007). 
105 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,128,286 (filed Mar. 12, 2007). 
106 In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, 866 (T.T.A.B. 1981). 
107 58.4%. 
108 These terms also account for over half of the records in the dataset: 53.88%. 
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based on those terms.109 Several of these words are in marks that have 
also been registered.110 
 
E. This Mischaracterization of the Law Has a Real Impact on the 
Trademark Registration Process 
According to our research, initial refusals based on scandalousness 
are statistically much less likely to result in ultimate registrations than 
refusals based on other grounds.  The overall success rate for a response 
to an Office Action, when represented by an attorney, was 72%.111  That 
rate dropped to 45%112 for pro se applicants.  However, in our data, the 
success rate was less than 5%, significantly lower than either success 
rate and particularly significant given the applicants in our data were 
both represented by attorneys.  Furthermore, applicants are unlikely to 
respond to Office Actions based on scandalousness.  This may be 
because the majority of applicants in these situations are individuals and 
small businesses, because there are higher-than-average rates of pro se 
applicants for these marks, and/or because the lack of clear legal 
standards for examiners makes it too difficult for applicants to 
overcome refusals.  Data on each of these issues are presented below. 
 
109 58.4%.  The words that received that treatment were FUCK, SHIT, ASSHOLE, TITS, CUM, 
DOUCHEBAG, MILF, NIGGER/BLACK, BITCH, CUNT, AND BEAVER.   
110 For example, MILF, BEAVER, and TITS. 
111 Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 583, 616 (2013). 
112 Id. 
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1. Refusals Based on Scandalousness Disproportionately Impact 
Individuals and Small Businesses 
Over 97% of all applications in the dataset were filed by 
individuals and small businesses.  Though there were two applications 
where the legal entity is unknown,113 only one applicant, Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. (TBS), was clearly in possession of 
significant resources, such as money and access to legal support, as a 
Fortune 500 company. 
 
2. Applicants are Unlikely to Respond to a Refusal Based on 
Scandalousness 
According to our research, applicants are unlikely to respond to a 
refusal based on scandalousness, and instead let the mark go abandoned.  
Of those that responded, the applicants were evenly split between 
smaller businesses and individuals at 23 each (49%).  The final 
respondent was an unknown legal entity.  However, given the larger 
overall number of applicants that were individuals, there appears to be a 
smaller chance that an individual will respond.  Only 17% of 
individuals filed a response to an Office Action, as compared with 24% 
of small businesses.  Even so, applicants are highly unlikely overall to 
respond when their proposed mark is rejected for being scandalous or 
immoral. 
 
113 Per the USPTO information. See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 79,014,488 
(filed Aug. 18, 2005) (COCK & BALLS IT’S JUST WRONG); U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 76,663,546 (filed July 24, 2006) (CUM PARTAY). 
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This low probability of response may be related to the high 
number of applicants who are not represented by an attorney.  Of the 
marks rejected for being scandalous or immoral, 75%114 of applicants 
filed their trademark applications pro se.  Both of the marks that 
ultimately overcame the scandalousness rejection were filed by 
applicants represented by an attorney.  In contrast, of the approved 
marks, the numbers are reversed with 79% being represented by 
attorneys and only 21% filing pro se.115 
 
Applicants responded to an Office Action containing a rejection on 
scandalous or immoral grounds less than one-quarter of the time.  There 
was no response to 80% of rejections, thus resulting in abandonment of 
the mark.  Applicants represented by an attorney were more likely to 
respond to a rejection.116  However, even when there was a response to 
the rejection, only twice in our dataset was that response successful in 
overcoming the scandalousness argument.  This number constitutes 
fewer than five percent117 of all responses, with the other nearly 96%118 
failing in their challenge.  Of responses that failed, only five of them 




115 78.95% of approved marks were represented by an attorney, contrasted with 21.05% that were 
pro se. 
116 57.45% of applicants who responded were represented by an attorney as compared to 42.55% 
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3. When Applicants Do Respond, They Argue Contextual Factors 
When applicants did respond, most frequently applicants argued a 
variety of contextual factors to show that the mark was not scandalous 
and that those factors supported registration of the mark.  A contextual 
argument was made in 64% of all responses, and was the most common 
argument presented by trademark owners. 
 
The individual arguments regarding context ranged from the very 
specific to more general arguments regarding overall attitudes of 
society.  The most common argument in rebutting a rejection for 
scandalousness was that a particular term had alternate meanings.  An 
argument for alternate meanings of the mark in question was advanced 
in 32%120 of Office Action responses.  The next most common 
argument was that the word was not scandalous in the context of the 
marketplace.  This type of argument was advanced in just over 25%121 
of responses to a rejection.  This included arguments both regarding the 
specific location where the goods were sold, such as regulated shops or 
adult markets,122 and also that the mark wasn’t scandalous in the context 
of the specific goods, such as on shirts being sold by PETA.123  Visual 
context, while not brought up often by the applicant, appeared to be the 




122 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003) (POST-
TITS). 
123 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,168,702 (filed Nov. 3, 2010) (FUCK MEAT). 
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a rejection for scandalousness.124 
 
It is very difficult to overcome a Section 2(a) refusal based on 
scandalousness.  While contextual factors were the most frequently 
argued rebuttal, those arguments were only successful in two of the 232 
records we reviewed.  More frequently, if the examiner then considered 
context, such argument was used against the applicant.  The applicant in 
the case of “TALKING COCK,” for example, specifically pointed out 
that there are regulations in place to ensure products of an adult nature, 
such as the ones at issue, are adequately separated from the general 
population, and particularly from children.125  This information 
regarding the specific marketplace for the good in question was, 
however, not addressed or rebutted in the examiner’s subsequent Office 
Action.  Instead, the examiner copied verbatim the original arguments 
against the product: that the illustrations depicted the word in a vulgar 
fashion and the product made vulgar statements.126  No further 
elaboration on the arguments was made, nor were the applicant’s 
arguments addressed.  This example is typical of the dataset. 
 
124 In the case of the mark, WHITE ASS, the applicant pointed out the ears and tail adorning the 
“A” of the mark, indicating the reference to a donkey rather than a more vulgar usage of the word 
“ass.”  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (Response to 
Office Action dated May 23, 2011).  In the case of FUGLY FRUITS, the applicant pointed to the 
“playful stylized form of the mark” to show that there would not be a potential perception that the 
word “fugly” meant “fucking ugly.”  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,736,643 (filed 
Oct. 19, 2005) (FUGLY FRUITS) (Response to Office Action dated May 25, 2006). 
125 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (Response to Office 
Action dated Oct. 2, 2006). 
126 Id. (Office Action dated Dec. 21, 2007). 
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Of the trademark records reviewed, only two responses were 
effective in convincing the trademark examiner to withdraw his or her 
Section 2(a) refusal, and in both cases the applicant argued context.127  
In fact, with those two exceptions, in none of the examined files was the 
mark approved by the examiner based on contextual factors.  Rather, 
where the applicant argued context, the examiner often used that context 
to reinforce the scandalousness of the mark instead of withdrawing the 
Section 2(a) rejection, or disregarded the contextual argument entirely.  
Even when the examiner was the first to address the context of the 
mark, this context was used only to bolster the argument that the mark 
was scandalous or immoral.  Some of the more common arguments 
beyond the broad argument of alternate meanings or general context are 
that the mark is intended to be humorous or a double entendre, that the 
mark was not scandalous in context of visual imagery, or that there are 
third-party registrations already approved by the USPTO containing the 
same material terms. 
a. Double Entendre 
Several applicants argued that their mark was intentionally 
humorous or a double entendre, thus mitigating or eliminating any 
scandalous meaning.  This argument does not appear to be accepted as a 
reason to find something non-scandalous.  Often, the double entendre 
appears not to be considered at all as contributing to the overall 
commercial impression of the mark, even if raised by the applicant.  In 
cases where the entire phrase had a vulgar meaning, even if it was not 
intended or used in that fashion, the examiner stated that the vulgar 
meaning of the phrase is what matters rather than the potential double-
entendre, despite possible visual context or other evidence showing the 
non-vulgar meaning. 
For example, the mark HAND JOB contains a clear subtitle of 
“Nails & Spa” on the logo. Despite this, the examiner stated that 
because “hand job” as a phrase has no non-vulgar meaning, the play on 
words was not persuasive.128  This is despite the applicant pointing out 
that taken as individual words in combination with the subtitle, “hand 
job” can have a meaning that is not vulgar.  Similarly, FAT COCK 
 
127 Because of the vague standard and the little evidence required to sustain a rejection for 
scandalousness (dictionary definitions), it is very difficult for applicants to overcome a rejection 
on this basis in the registration process.  The only marks that have overcome a rejection based on 
scandalousness are WHITE ASS, and FUGLY FRUITS.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,736,643 (filed Oct. 19, 2005) (FUGLY FRUITS).  PHAG was initially rejected and 
abandoned, but when revived went through with no apparent rejection. Registration No. 
4,135,694.  The applications for WHITE ASS and FUGLY were later abandoned for other 
reasons. 
128 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009). 
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BEER was rejected due to the phrase “fat cock” despite a potential 
meaning of “fat rooster” rather than “fat penis” because a Google search 
indicated that the phrase “fat cock” is vulgar and used in a sexual 
context.129  The applicant submitted a preliminary label indicating the 
intended meaning is that of “fat rooster” but this evidence was ruled 
insufficient to overcome the rejection because of the preliminary status. 
b. Visual Context 
When visual context is taken into account for a double entendre or 
humorous mark as part of the overall commercial impression of the 
mark, it is used in the dataset solely to bolster, rather than to rebut, an 
examiner’s initial rejection.  In the case of POST-TITS, while the 
applicant pointed out the parodying nature of the goods, the examiner 
determined that imagery of breasts on the note pads made the mark 
vulgar, and that vulgarity made the mark scandalous.130  Likewise in the 
case of BONER BATS ROCK HARD WOOD, the examining attorney 
found that the image of the bat with two baseballs reinforced the mark’s 
vulgar meaning and rendered the mark scandalous.131  The same is true 
for the mark CAMEL TOES, in which the examiner stated that the 
design of the mark dissipated any double entendre and clearly 
communicated the mark’s vulgar nature.132 
However, in what appears to be a contradiction, for the mark YOU 
CUM LIKE A GIRL,133 the examiner pointed out that a third-party 
registration brought up by the applicant, CUM TOGETHER,134 is a 
double entendre referencing a Beatles song and was therefore 
acceptable. 
 
129 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011). 
130 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,536,775 (filed July 22, 2003). 
131 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006). 
132 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002). 
133 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005). 
134 CUM TOGETHER, Registration No. 2,844,606. 
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Out of all marks with visual elements that contribute to the overall 
commercial impression of the mark, the visual context was not 
discussed by either the examiner or the applicant in roughly half of 
those records.  Instead, the examiner focused on the words themselves 
as vulgar, abstracted from the visual context, and therefore scandalous 
or immoral.  For many of those marks, the visual context of the mark 
likely would not have been beneficial as it most frequently contributed 
to the overall commercial impression of the mark is such a way as to 
reinforce the vulgar implication with which the examiner was 
concerned. 
In rejections that addressed visual context as part of the 
commercial impression of the mark, the issue was raised most often in 
the initial Office Action and used only by the examiner to reinforce the 
vulgar or scandalous rejection.  In three cases, the visual context of the 
mark was not discussed until the second Office Action, and in each of 
those situations the context was used exclusively to reinforce the 
vulgarity of the mark.135 
Applicants did occasionally attempt to bring in the visual context 
of the mark in their responses.  However, of those, only two 
successfully used that context to dispute the Section 2(a) rejection, 
WHITE ASS and FUGLY FRUITS.  This was the case even when there 
were aspects of the visual context supporting a non-vulgar reference.  
 
135 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,082,839 (filed July 12, 2010) (BONER BIBLE); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,883,100 (filed Dec. 1, 2009) (TOUCH YOUR TITS); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002) (CAMEL TOES). 
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For instance, WHITE ASS included ears and a tail on the “A” in the 
mark, clearly indicating that the mark referenced the “donkey” meaning 
of the word “ass,” rather than any vulgar meaning.136  Despite this, the 
visual context was not apparently referred to by the examiner who relied 
solely on the meaning of the phrase “white ass” when initially rejecting 
the mark.  After the applicant pointed out the visual aspects of the mark, 
the examiner withdrew the Section 2(a) rejection.137  In FUGLY 
FRUITS, the applicant pointed to the “playful stylized form” to support 
their argument that “fugly” meant “fun ugly” rather than “fucking 
ugly.”138  After this argument was raised, the Section 2(a) refusal was 
withdrawn. 
In some cases, the examiner and the applicant focused on different 
aspects of the design to support their respective positions.  In DONKEY 
PUNCH, the applicant pointed out that there was an actual donkey on 
the label, supporting his assertion that the mark referred to an actual 
donkey rather than the sexual term.139  However, the examiner pointed 
out that the phrase “You’ll know it when it hits you in the back of the 
head!” also appears on the label, thus implying the scandalous meaning 
is in fact what was intended.140  In the case of SCHLONG WEAR, the 
applicant asserted that the image comprised two monkeys with the boy 
monkey offering the girl monkey a banana, to be colored yellow in the 
final tag, and that the banana was in no way attached to or near the boy 
monkey’s groin to imply a sexual meaning.141  The examiner insisted 
that the fact that the boy monkey is offering the girl monkey a long, 
thick object reinforced the imagery of the word “schlong” and that 
modifications to the mark (coloring the banana yellow and giving the 
girl monkey a tail) did not change that.142 
In other situations in which the applicant attempted to use visual 
context to argue that the overall commercial impression of the mark was 
not scandalous, the examiner either did not address that context in 
subsequent Office Actions or dismissed the evidence altogether.  For 
example, in the mark HAND JOB, though the applicant attached an 
image of the company’s logo, which reinforced the double entendre 
rather than the scandalous meaning given the clear statement of “Nails 
& Spa” below the main mark, the examiner did not address the visual 
context in the subsequent Office Action.143  In FAT COCK BEER, 
 
136 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010). 
137 Id. 
138 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,736,643 (filed Oct. 19, 2005) (Response to Office 
Action dated May 25, 2006). 
139 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,089,125 (filed Jan. 23, 2007). 
140 Id. (Second Office Action dated Oct. 11, 2007). 
141 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,666,012 (filed Feb. 15, 2009). 
142 Id. (Second Office Action dated June 8, 2006). 
143 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,671,044 (filed Feb. 15, 2009). 
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because the label was still preliminary, though it did in fact depict an 
actual rooster, the visual mark was ruled not to overcome the 
objection.144 
Overall, visual context is frequently not addressed by examining 
attorneys except when it supports rejection, and even an assertion of the 
visual context by the applicant appears not to be beneficial unless it is 
so clear as to create no doubt about the underlying meaning of the 
term.145 
c. Third-Party Registrations 
Several applicants in the dataset raised third-party registrations in 
their responses.  Most often, the examiner’s response was that third-
party registrations are irrelevant and each mark must stand on its own.  
Examiners also stated that “whether because of administrative error or 
otherwise, some marks have been registered even though they may be in 
violation of the governing statutory standard [but that] does not mean 
that the agency must forgo applying that standard in all other cases.”146  
This is despite the fact that some registered marks contain the same or 
very similar words or imagery in them.  On the occasions in which the 
previously registered mark was recognized by the examiner in the 
subsequent Office Action, it was used exclusively to distinguish such 
marks from the instant application. 
For example, when addressing the BONER BATS mark, the 
applicant submitted evidence of third-party registrations with similar 
words and imagery, but the examiner stated that these marks are not 
only irrelevant but also neutral because none of them are referencing a 
penis like BONER BATS.147  This was despite the fact that several of 
the marks used the word “boner” in the same sense and at least one, 
BONERWEAR148 had a mark consisting of an upright bone with two 
skulls at its base, very similar to BONER BATS’s bat with baseballs 
imagery.  Similarly, for the mark YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL,149 though 
the applicant used the mark CUM TOGETHER150 to support 
registration, the examiner stated that the double entendre of that mark 
made it acceptable. 
 
144 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,253,332 (filed Feb. 28, 2011). 
145 Such as in the WHITE ASS mark.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed 
Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS) 
146 In re Blvd. Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).   
147 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,904,458 (filed June 9, 2006). 
148 BONERWEAR, Registration No. 3,163,407. 
149 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005). 
150 Registration No. 2,844,606. 
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4. Applicants’ Contextual Arguments are Rarely Successful in 
Overturning a Refusal 
 
In general, if an examiner did not discuss context in the initial 
scandalousness rejection, almost half the time (43%)151 the examiner 
discussed context in a subsequent Office Action.  Overall, examiners 
addressed contextual factors in subsequent Office Actions 66%152 of the 
time, whether or not these factors were brought up previously.  Of cases 
in which the applicant argued context, whether initially addressed by the 
examiner or not, context was not raised in only 20% of final Office 
Actions. 
However, a contextual argument on behalf of the applicant did not 
increase the chances that an examiner would address context in a 
subsequent Office Action.  Though 64%153 of applicant responses 
argued contextual factors, when the examiner did not address context in 
the initial Office Action and the applicant addressed context in a 






154 This is out of the thirty responses where the applicant argued context.  In fifteen subsequent 
Office Actions, the examiner also discusses context (where context was not addressed initially).  
Additionally, there were six times (20% of responses with context) where, even though the 
applicant discussed context, the subsequent Office Actions did not.  The remaining records were 
split between five instances where context was addressed in both the initial Office Action and the 
response, and four records consisted of the two marks where the 2(a) rejection was withdrawn 
and two where the application was abandoned prior to the issuance of a subsequent Office Action. 
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F. There are Inconsistencies in Reasoning Across Refusals 
Several words that served as the basis of a scandalousness refusal 
in some marks were material components of other marks that passed 
through to publication.  For each of the published marks, those words 
were generally not flagged as presenting an issue.155 
1. There are Many Marks Containing the Same Terms That Have 
Been Both Registered and Refused 
Despite the abstraction of salient terms in particular marks by the 
USPTO, there are often both approvals and rejections for marks 
containing the same terms with very similar overall commercial 
impressions.156  While POTHEAD THE CREATIVE HIGH157 was 
registered, for example, POTHEAD 420158 was rejected on the basis 
that “pothead” is slang for smoker of marijuana.  WET BEAVER159 was 
approved, while BIG WET ROUND BOOTYS & ILL FLOWS160 was 
rejected.  The latter mark was rejected because use of the word “wet,” 
with other words like “booty,” reinforced the scandalous meaning.161  
 
155 With the exception of PHAG, which were ultimately registered.  Registration No. 4,135,694. 
156 In addition to the examples noted here from our data set, there are others that create 
interesting distinctions.  Though most marks with the word “cock” in our sample were rejected, it 
has also been permitted registration.  COCKSOX was registered, for example, even though the 
specimen clearly indicates that the word is likely in reference to a penis, and the most common 
reason for refusing a mark with the word “cock” in it is because the term is vulgar slang for a 
penis.  COCKSOX, Registration No. 4,123,962.  In several cases, the context of the mark 
reinforces this meaning and further supports the rejection but in many, the word alone is enough 
without any further context. The mark GOD DOES NOT HAVE A PENIS was rejected because 
the mark was likely offensive due the reference to God and the existence of a penis or genitalia.  
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,212,829 (filed June 22, 2007).  In the approved mark, 
HAPPY PENIS, the USPTO does not make a reference to the word “penis.”  Registration No. 
2,853,632.  This mark is brought up by the applicant for COPYCOCK.XXX who specifically 
noted that: 
HAPPY PENIS [RN: 2853632] is a registered trademark . . . Yet you request to deny 
my trademark for COPYCOCK because . . . “the term Cock in the proposed mark is a 
reference to a penis and is thus scandalous because it is considered vulgar usage.” YET 
HAPPY PENIS IS ACCEPTABLE? When I think about rubbing body lotion from 
Happy Penis on my body . . . I do think of a PENIS.  This doesn’t make sense to me.  If 
I had filed for HAPPY COPYCOCK would that have not been vulgar . . . as long as 
it’s HAPPY it’s okay?  
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,699,858 (filed Aug. 24, 2005) (Paper Correspondence 
Incoming dated Jan. 4, 2007). 
157 Registration No. 2,058,380. 
158 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,290,998 (filed Sept. 27, 2007). 
159 Registration No. 2,437,957. 
160 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,955,262 (filed Aug. 18, 2006). 
161 Though “wet” alone is not a cause for rejection, in the rejected mark, BIG WET ROUND 
BOOTYS & ILL FLOWS, the word “wet” is used in conjunction with other scandalous words 
that reinforced the scandalousness of the mark.  However, the approved mark WET BEAVER 
appears to stand in contrast to this given that, based on rejected marks with the word “beaver” in 
them, “beaver” is considered a scandalous term due to being vulgar slang for female genitalia or 
pubic area.  See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008) 
(BEAVERSHAVER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,571,207 (filed Feb. 19, 2005) 
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This contradiction persists despite the fact that the word “beaver” has 
been separately rejected for scandalousness.162  Similarly, 
MILFHUNTER163 and FAT MILF164 were approved, while GOT 
MILF165 was refused registration.166  CAMEL TOES AND DESIGN167 
for apparel was rejected because “camel toe” is “well-known [as] crotch 
cleavage.”168  The word mark NICE CAMELTOE169 was rejected for 
the same reason.170  In contrast, the word mark CAMEL TOES171 was 
registered for apparel without objection.  Marks with the salient terms 
ANAL,172 ASS,173 COCK,174 CUM,175 FAG,176 MILF,177 PENIS,178 
 
(HORNY BEAVER).  However, the only apparent rejection for the mark was for being 
ornamental based on the Office Action response on file. 
162 See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,571,207 (filed Feb. 19, 2005) (HORNY 
BEAVER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,462,627 (filed May 1, 2008) 
(BEAVERSHAVER). 
163 Registration No. 2,936,139. 
164 Registration No. 3,372,094. 
165 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005). 
166 MILFHUNTER and FAT MILF, were both approved without any reference to the word 
“MILF” although MILFHUNTER was initially refused for being descriptive.  MILFHUNTER, 
Registration No. 2,936,139; FAT MILF, Registration No. 3,372,094.  In contrast, in the rejected 
marks, MILF, as a vulgar acronym including the word “fuck,” was the reason the marks were 
rejected. See e.g., U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,043,802 (filed Nov. 14, 2006) 
(MILF SEEKER), U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,614,007 (filed Apr. 21, 2005) 
(MILF GOLF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,126,313 (filed Mar. 8, 2007) (MILF 
AND COOKIES).  Additionally, as pointed out in GOT MILF and WANT MILF? the term is 
commonly associated with porn.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,710,449 (filed [date]) 
(WANT MILF?); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) (GOT 
MILF). 
167 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,173,865 (filed Oct. 13, 2002). 
168 Also, the design element reinforces the vulgar meaning.   
169 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,253,440 (filed May 22, 2003). 
170 In that Office Action, the examining attorney notes that “camel toe” refers to “to the shape 
formed by the vulva when extremely tight pants are worn.”   
171 Registration No. 1,872,570. 
172 In the Office Action for the approved mark, HUSTLER’S ANAL SEDUCTION, there is no 
mention of the word “anal” and the only rejection is for a disclaimer.  Registration No. 2,920,403.  
In both rejected marks, HERFIRSTANALSEX and HER FIRST ANAL SEX, only the first is 
rejected because of the word “anal” (it refers to an activity that is considered immoral by some 
people and illegal in some states) while the second is only refused for being descriptive and 
possibly misdescriptive.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,618,381 (filed Apr. 27, 2005) 
(HERFIRSTANALSEX); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,043,892 (filed Nov. 14, 
2006). 
173 Though “ass” is present in both approved and rejected marks, the word is never mentioned in 
the approved marks and in the rejected marks, “ass” alone is not the basis for refusal except in a 
single case.  Instead, in the rejected marks, they are rejected for compound words such as 
“asshole” or because of the presence of other words in the mark such as “mother fucker” or “coon 
ass.”  See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,100,568 (filed Aug. 5, 2010) (WHITE ASS) 
(rejected because the phrase “white ass” was scandalous); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,753,763 (filed Nov. 14, 2005) (SEXYASSMOFO.COM) (rejected because “mofo” is slang for 
“mother fucker; “sexyass” adds to offensiveness); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,087,533 (filed Jan. 21, 2007) (ASSHOLES ANONYMOUS) (rejected because “asshole” is 
vulgar slang); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,613,333 (filed Apr. 20, 2005) (KA 
KICK ASS SKATEBOARDS KABOARDS) (rejected based on the design portion of the mark 
depicting “a dog skeleton defecating or jumping over a pile of excrement”)U.S. Trademark 
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SLUT,179 and WHORE180 are other examples of marks that were both 
 
Application Serial No. 77,163,723 (filed Apr. 23, 2007) (HARD ASS CRACKER) (rejected 
based on “cracker” as an offensive term).  But see KICKASSMUSIC.COM, Registration No. 
2,796,559; KICK ASS LIMITED, Registration No. 2,039,645.  In a single case, JEWS KICK 
ASS, the mark was rejected because of the association of famous people with profanity.  U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,344,588 (filed Dec. 23, 2003). 
174 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,716,443 (filed Sept. 20, 2005) (“TALKING 
COCK”); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,264,154 (filed Mar. 11, 2011) (SOCK MY 
COCK); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,867,619 (filed Apr. 23, 2006) (COCK 
BLOCKER); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,791,173 (filed Jan. 13, 2006).  But see 
COCKSOX, Registration No. 4,123,962.  See also discussion, supra note 156. 
175 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No 78,059,173 (filed Apr. 19, 2001) (CUM); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,572,277 (filed Feb. 22, 2005) (CUMSTRONG); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,138,948 (filed Mar. 23, 2007) (FUN CUM); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,682,282 (filed July 31, 2005) (YOU CUM LIKE A GIRL); 
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76,663,546 (filed July 24, 2006) (CUM PARTAY); U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 77,317,522 (filed Oct. 31, 2007) (GOT CUM?).  But see CUM 
CUM, INC., Registration No. 2,036,162.  CUM CUM, INC. has no documents other than a 
registration certificate available on the TSDR.  However, its registration is in contrast with six 
marks that were rejected bearing the same word.  All of the rejected marks were rejected because 
the word “cum” means semen or ejaculate and is therefore vulgar. 
176 In the approved mark, though PHAG is initially rejected on disparaging grounds because 
“phag” is a phonetic equivalent to “fag,” the mark eventually is approved after being revived.  
PHAG, Registration No. 4,135,694.  In the three rejected marks, the term in the marks is “fag” 
rather than an alternate phonetic equivalent.  In the case of BFF BIG FUCKING FAGGOT, the 
mark is refused because “faggot” is a disparaging word and is combined with a vulgar term and 
therefore scandalous.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,722,463 (filed Apr. 25, 2009) 
(BFF BIG FUCKING FAGGOT).  In the other two marks, “fag” is a disparaging term and 
therefore the marks are rejected.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,164,481 (filed Sept. 
16, 2002) (FAG); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,565,055 (filed Sept. 8, 2008) 
(FAGHAGMATCH.COM). 
177 Both approved marks, MILFHUNTER and FAT MILF, were both approved without any 
reference to the word “MILF” although MILFHUNTER was initially refused for being 
descriptive.  MILFHUNTER, Registration No. 2,936,139; FAT MILF, Registration No. 
3,372,094.  In contrast, in the rejected marks, MILF, as a vulgar acronym including the word 
“fuck,” was the reason the marks were rejected.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,126,313 (filed Mar. 8, 2007) (MILF AND COOKIES); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
78,614,007 (filed Apr. 21, 2005) (MILF GOLF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 
77,043,802 (filed Nov. 14, 2006) (MILF SEEKER).  Additionally, as pointed out in GOT MILF 
and WANT MILF?, the term is commonly associated with porn.  U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 78,700,246 (filed Aug. 25, 2005) (GOT MILF); U.S. Trademark Application Serial 
No. 78,710,449 (filed Sept. 9, 2005) (WANT MILF?). 
178 See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,212,829 (filed June 22, 2007) (GOD DOES 
NOT HAVE A PENIS (GDNHAP)).  But see HAPPY PENIS, 2,853,632.  See also discussion, 
supra note 149. 
179 The approved mark SLUT.XXX was initially refused for being descriptive and an 
unacceptable specimen, however the word “slut” never came up.  SLUT.XXX, Registration No. 
3,243,680.  It is particularly interesting that this mark had “.XXX” in it similarly to 
GAYFACIALSXXX, FUCK.XXX, and COPYCOCK.XXX.  However, in two of those cases, the 
presence of “.XXX” served to reinforce the sexual meaning (the XXX never came up in 
GAYFACIALSXXX though the examiner does note the mark is applied to sexually explicit 
services).  Of the three rejected marks that contained “slut,”—S.L.U.T.S., SLUT PUPPY, 
BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS—two were rejected for different reasons than the presence of the 
word “slut.”  S.L.U.T.S. was rejected for likelihood of confusion.  U.S. Trademark Application 
Serial No. 77,368,404 (filed Jan. 10, 2008).  SLUT PUPPY was rejected for needing a disclaimer.  
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,948,669 (filed Aug. 9, 2006).  That being said, 
BLACKCOCKSWHITESLUTS was rejected because “cock” and “sluts” are vulgar terms.  U.S. 
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approved and rejected—in some instances the marks were refused 
registration based on scandalousness, and in others they passed through 
to registration without issuance of an Office Action. 
We conducted an in-depth look at trademark applications for 
marks containing the words BITCH, POTHEAD, SHIT, SLUT, and 
WHORE, in order to understand the depth of the inconsistencies both 
within and between marks.  There was some measure of inconsistency 
within marks containing each of these terms as a primary feature.  In 
fact, for each term, there were both approved and rejected registrations.  
With the exception of SHIT, all of the words listed above had registered 
marks containing those terms as a primary feature of the mark.  Even in 
the case of SHIT, however, there were several marks that were 
approved but abandoned prior to publication. 
 
2. Marks Containing Some Terms Tend to be Rejected, and Others Tend 
to be Accepted, Inconsistently 
Overall, the data indicate general trends among trademark 
examiners to either approve or deny marks containing particular terms.  
For example, examiners tend to reject marks containing the word “shit,” 
 
Trademark Application Serial No. 78,785,542 (filed Jan. 5, 2006). 
180 Interestingly, though the word “whore” is in both an approved mark and three rejected marks, 
none of them mention it in any Office Actions.  The approved mark WM WHOREMOANS was 
initially rejected for a discrepancy in in entity type but no other reasons.  WM WHOREMOANS, 
Registration No. 3,506,488.  The other three marks—DUMB BLONDE WHORES, THE 
WHORE STORE, and THEY’RE ALL WHORES, AL—were refused on other grounds but the 
word “whore” never came up.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,022,334 (filed Apr. 23, 
2010) (THE WHORE STORE); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,610,626 (filed Apr. 
18, 2005) (THEY’RE ALL WHORES, AL); U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,731,907 
(filed May 7, 2009) (DUMB BLONDE WHORES). 
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but register marks with the words “bitch” and “whore.”  This appears to 
be based on a de facto, unofficial consideration of third-party 
registrations by examiners in the examination process.  Anecdotal 
evidence in the records demonstrates that examiners consider third-
party registrations selectively when approving or rejecting applications 
for registration.  For example, there is an email in the record from the 
examiner for SEXY BITCH to an apparent supervisor, stating: 
 
[T]here are 34 registered marks with the word ‘Bitch’ as either the 
mark or a component thereof, such as FILMBITCH for TV 
production services, BITCH for a women’s magazine, 
BITCHWEAR for clothing, TOTAL BITCH for cosmetics.  We are 
not going to hold SEXY BITCH 2(a) – please let me know if you 
think we should.181 
 
One particularly troubling instance of this inconsistency was 
evident in the USPTO records regarding a refusal for NBB NATURAL 
BORN BITCHES.182  In that record, the examiner noted that it was an 
“uphill” battle to reject the mark, but did so anyway.183  The applicant 
was an individual filing pro se, and did not respond to the refusal, so the 
application went abandoned without further inquiry.184 
In the case of marks containing POTHEAD, only one mark was 
rejected.  In the Office Action for that mark, POTHEAD 420, the 
examiner stated that the term “pothead” is disapproving slang for “a 
regular or heavy smoker of marijuana” and “420” is also slang for 
smoking marijuana.185  Because the mark references an illegal activity, 
it was rejected for being scandalous.  However, the rest of the marks we 
analyzed that included the term “pothead” were not rejected under 
Section 2(a), and, in fact, three were registered.186  In particular, despite 
the rejection of POTHEAD 420 in part because of the “420,” a different 
mark, THE POTHEAD DIARIES EST. 4.20.09 was registered with no 
Section 2(a) rejection despite the same reference.187 
Where there are general trends indicating approval or refusal for 
marks containing a particular term, those general trends are apparently 
 
181 Registration No. 2,870,126 (Email Incoming dated Aug. 30, 3002) (Email from Mary Sparrow 
to Debbie Cohn and Ron Williams, August 26, 2002.  Deborah Cohn later served as 
Commissioner of Trademarks from 2010–14). 
182 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,507,090 (filed Oct. 27, 2004) (NBB NATURAL 
BORN BITCHES). 
183 Id. (Notation to File dated June 9, 2005) (Karla Perkins, “discussed uphill 2(a) with TS”). 
184 Id. 
185 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,290,998 (filed Sept. 27, 2007). 
186 This is 23.08% of the marks we looked at containing POTHEAD.  POTHEAD, Registration 
No. 3,956,340; POTHEADS, Registration No. 4,365,056; THE POTHEAD DIARIES EST. 
4.20.09, Registration No. 4,534,051. 
187 Registration No. 4,534,051. 
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inconsistent with one another.  That is, why should marks with SHIT be 
rejected in the abstract categorically, while marks with BITCH or SLUT 
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G. The Morality Bar is Not Effective at Keeping Immoral Trademarks 
out of the Marketplace 
Our evidence shows a lot of uncertainty and inconsistency 
throughout the application of the Section 2(a) bar to registration for 
scandalousness.  One thing, however, is clear: the bar is not succeeding 
at removing trademarks from the marketplace.  A majority of rejected 
marks that we reviewed were easily determined to still be in use, either 
by the applicant or a third party.188 
 
188 Overall, 53.45% (124) of marks rejected under Section 2(a) are still in use, by either the 
application or a third-party as based on Internet searches for the marks. 
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1. A Majority of Marks Refused Registration for Scandalousness are 
Still Being Used 
 
Over half of the marks we investigated are still in use, whether by 
the applicant or a third-party.  In addition to those marks determined to 
be in use or abandoned, the current use status of just under 5% of the 
marks was unclear.  Of the marks still in use, approximately half (65) of 
those marks are being used by the applicant, and the rest are being used 
by at least one third-party.  If any or all of the marks whose current 
usage was unclear are, in fact, still being used by the applicant, as much 
as 61% (75) of rejected marks are still in use by the applicant after 
rejection.  This would also increase the number of marks still in use to 
134, up to nearly 60%189 of the total rejected marks in the data set.  
Even if those unknown marks are no longer in use, over half of the 
rejected marks are still being used in some fashion. 
Given that only eight of the marks are being used solely by the 
applicant, which is fewer than 7% of the marks still in use, it is clear 
that refusing registration does not prevent proliferation of the marks.  In 
fact, without recourse it is clear that third-parties are likely to begin 
using the same mark, continuing the presence of these types of marks in 
the marketplace.190  Even marks that are currently not being used have 
no impediment from being used again in the future, whether by the 
 
189 57.75%. 
190 47.5% of marks still in use after rejection are being used by a third-party.  Though it is 
possible current users are somehow affiliated with the original applicant, it is equally possible the 
current user is a completely separate entity. 
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original applicant or someone new. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the applicable legal standard, the determination of 
whether a mark is scandalous and thus barred from registration should 
be made in the context of current attitudes of the day.  The relevant 
inquiry is whether a substantial composite of the general public would 
find the mark scandalous in the context of the particular marketplace in 
contemporary society.  However, most refusals in our dataset failed to 
consider context of any kind, either in the commercial impression of the 
mark or the marketplace in which the goods/services are found.  Despite 
the fact that they are abstracted from the marketplace, dictionary 
definitions have been held to be sufficient to support a refusal, and these 
are the primary evidence used to support refusals on this basis.  The use 
of dictionary definitions to support refusals was consistent across 
various marketplaces, including “adult” or “niche” markets.  When 
examiners did consider context, it was nearly exclusively used as an 
argument against registration: Use of a possibly scandalous mark in an 
adult-oriented marketplace was an indication that a scandalous meaning 
was intended; use of the mark in a general marketplace was an 
indication that the mark was even more scandalous.  We found the same 
tendency across various goods and services, creating a catch-22 for the 
applicant.  While examiners often acknowledged the relevance of 
context de jure, they frequently disregarded it de facto. 
The implications of these findings are real.  There is an impact on 
the trademark registration process generally, and on small businesses 
and individuals in particular, which comprise a disproportionate 
percentage of applicants.  These applicants also are frequently pro se 
and unlikely to respond to refusals.  When they do respond, they often 
argue contextual factors that may or may not be addressed by USPTO 
examiners and are rarely successful in overturning refusals.  
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in reasoning across refusals.  
There are many similar marks that have been both registered in some 
cases and rejected in others.  There are also comparable terms that tend 
to trigger rejections or acceptances, without apparent justification for 
the differential treatment.  While some inconsistency is to be expected 
given the non-precedential nature of third-party registrations, the 
inconsistencies in our dataset were notable.  In addition, to the extent 
that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act seeks to keep immoral trademarks 
out of the marketplace, it is not succeeding.  The majority of marks 
refused registration on this basis are still being used. 
Trademark registration is a powerful tool to an entity interested in 
building a strong brand.  Registration confers significant benefits to a 
trademark owner, both substantively and procedurally.  The registration 
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system serves also as a mechanism for consumer protection, 
contributing at some level to efficiencies in the consumer marketplace.  
Accordingly, bars to registration should be applied thoughtfully.  Our 
findings indicate that this is not the case with regard to the bar for 
“scandalous” trademarks. 
 
